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Abstract
We present a laboratory experiment in which we investigate bidding behavior with independent
private values in the recently proposed bisection auction, and compare it with two classical auction
formats - the Vickrey auction and the English auction. We test whether subjects behave strategically
equivalent, following the dominant truth-telling strategy, as predicted by theory. Furthermore, we
provide some insights concerning the learning process, the efficiency of allocation, and the revenue to
the auctioneer. The data show that the bisection auction performs better than the Vickrey auction
and only in some terms worse than the English auction.
JEL Codes. D44, C91.
Keywords. experiment, auction, private value, Vickrey auction, English auction, bisection auction,
strategic equivalence.
1 Introduction
A well known theoretical result for private value single item auctions is the strategic equivalence of the
sealed bid second-price auction and the English auction. This result was shown by Vickrey1 in his seminal
1961 contribution to auction theory [12]. Strategic equivalence of these two auctions implies that, as
long as bidders behave rationally, the same bidder wins and pays the same price. Two main results
were established: first of all, truth-telling is a weakly dominant strategy, independent of the a-priori
distribution of the valuations of the bidders, the number of bidders or their risk attitudes. Secondly, the
∗e.grigorieva@ke.unimaas.nl. Department of Quantitative Economics, Maastricht University, P.O. Box 616, 6200 MD
Maastricht, The Netherlands.
†m.strobel@algec.unimaas.nl. Department of Economics, Universiteit Maastricht, P.O. Box 616, 6200 MD Maastricht,
The Netherlands.
1For this reason the sealed bid second price auction also known nowadays as the Vickrey auction.
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resulting truth-telling equilibrium is efficient in the sense that the object gets assigned to the bidder who
values it most.
Yet both the Vickrey auction and the English auction have their drawbacks in practical use. As any
direct mechanism the Vickrey auction requires all participants to reveal complete and exact preference
information. Buyers might be reluctant to truthfully reveal their full private value if its revelation could
have a negative strategic long-term impact [10]. For example, after such an auction the buyer will be
at a disadvantage in future negotiations with the seller who may be able to extract more surplus in the
future using information about the buyer’s valuation.
A significant problem with the English auction is that it might proceed at a very slow pace, if very small
price increments is chosen. This shortcoming can be devastating, for instance, when using auctions to
allocate highly perishable resources in real-time, like network capacities or electric power. One remedy is
to introduce a minimum or a fixed bid increment, as has been done for example in the spectrum auctions.
This though is known to have a negative impact on the auction’s efficiency [2].
The question that arises is: how to design an auction that elicits less information about bidders’ valua-
tions than the Vickrey auction but still enough to guarantee an efficient allocation and which is at the
same time faster than the English auction. In [5] a new iterative auction that possesses these properties,
called the bisection auction, is introduced. The main idea of this auction is to search for the winner
(the player with the highest valuation) and the price (the second highest valuation) using the bisection
method. The auction consists of several rounds in each of which the auctioneer announces a price and
players report their demand. Depending on the players’ answers the price of the next round can increase
or decrease and some players can be eliminated from the auction. The precise description of the auction
rules will be given in Section 2.
Grigorieva et al. show that the bisection auction is strategically equivalent to the Vickrey auction (and
hence also to the English auction) [5]. Therefore it preserves efficiency and has truth-telling as a dominant
strategy. While being strategically equivalent to the Vickrey and English auctions the bisection auction
outperforms them in terms of speed and valuation revelation requirement. Contrary to the English
auction the bisection procedure guarantees a fast and predictable termination of the proposed auction.
In comparison with the Vickrey auction, the bisection auction requires much less information to be
revealed to the auctioneer. Through incremental querying the auctioneer asks bidders for very limited
information about their valuation, namely whether the valuation is more than an asked price or not.
Information already revealed guides the selection of subsequent queries in such a way that only pertinent
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information is asked. As soon as it becomes clear to the auctioneer that a particular bidder doesn’t
possess relevant information, i.e information which helps the auctioneer to find the winner and the price,
this bidder is eliminated from the auction. An optimal outcome is determined despite the fact that
almost all bidders’ valuations have only been partially revealed. Only the bidder with the second highest
valuation reveals it entirely, something that is inevitable in a Vickrey implementation [4].
Given the advantages of the bisection auction, it seems strange that one does not come across it in
practical applications. One potential reason is that while all three auctions are theoretically equivalent,
they might differ substantially from a behavioral point of view when boundedly rational decision makers
are involved. Several experiments were conducted so far for testing the strategic equivalence of the
Vickrey and English auctions in the laboratory. The results by and large show that in contrast with
theory players typically do not behave in an equivalent way. Behavior according to the dominant truth-
telling strategy was observed more often in the English auction (see e.g [1] and [7]). In the Vickrey
auction, observed bids often exceeded the predicted level ([6], [7] and [8]). As conjectured in [9], this
difference in behavior can be attributed to different information flows inherent in the structure of the two
auctions. The structure of the English auction makes it relatively transparent to players that they should
not bid above their valuations - any time a player bids above his valuation and wins he necessarily loses
money. In contrast, in the Vickrey auction there is no such direct link between the bid of a winner and
the price he has to pay. In the Vickrey auction a player does not necessarily lose money if he bids above
his private valuation and wins. This sustains the illusion that overbidding improves the probability of
winning with only the little risk of paying a price above the own valuation. The feedback mechanism to
learn and to correct overbidding is therefore weaker in the Vickrey procedure.
The reported breakdown of the strategic equivalence of the Vickrey and English auctions with respect
to behavior raises justified doubts on the behavioral equivalence of the bisection auction and the others.
The bisection auction due to its more complicated rules seems to be more difficult to understand. An
particularly uncommon feature for auctions is that the price is moving up and down. It might make
bidders think that with bidding high initially and hoping that the price would go down later in the
auction, they can increase their profit by overbidding. In this sense the bisection auction also lacks
the tight cognitive connection between probability to win and the price to be paid. The situation calls
for an initial test of behavioral equivalence before putting the bisection mechanism to practice. One
could argue, that market forces will drive out irrational behavior and will lead to the dominant strategy
behavior sooner or later. The process, however, will not be free of frictions (e.g. law suits) and thus
a good ex-ante estimate of the behavioral anomalies in the bisection auction will be helpful. The goal
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of this paper is to make some first steps into the investigation of the practical usage of the bisection
auction. Therefore we test all three auction types in a laboratory experiment and compare them with
respect to truth-bidding, revenue and efficiency.
In comparison to the other auctions the bisection auction did fairly well and much better than we
initially expected. The performance is quite comparable to the English auction and in terms of some
measurements better than the Vickrey auction.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly introduces the rules of the bisection auction. Section
3 describes the experimental design and laboratory procedure. Section 4 reports the results and tests
and Section 5 concludes with a summary and some open questions. In the appendix the instructions,
the post-experimental questionnaire and additional tables with relevant data are presented.
2 The bisection auction
Suppose a single indivisible object is auctioned. The buyers’ valuations are supposed to be integer,
randomly drawn from a bounded interval2 – by default of the form [0, 2R) for some positive integer R.
The bisection auction has R rounds. The price sequence starts at the middle of the initial interval with
a price equal to 2R−1. Bidders report their demand at the current price by sealed bids. Yes stands for
the announcement to be willing to buy at the current price, no for the contrary. As a function of these
bids, the auctioneer announces the price of the next round.
In case there are at least two players submitting a yes-bid, the price goes up to the middle of the upper
half interval, i.e. to the interval [2R−1, 2R). The players that are allowed to participate actively in the
next round are the ones that submitted yes. In case there is at most one player submitting yes, attention
shifts to the lower half interval, i.e. the interval [0, 2R−1) and the price goes down to the middle of this
interval. The active players in the next round are the ones that submitted no. In case there is a single
buyer that submitted yes, this buyer becomes the winner and gets the object. Nevertheless the auction
doesn’t end, but continues. The winner, although he is no longer active, is considered to submit yes to
all prices that are proposed beyond the moment he became the winner.3 Iterating this procedure will
eventually yield a winner and a price. If in no round a winner was determined then ties are broken by
random assignment to a player who is still active after R rounds.
2For the generalization of the bisection auction for the setting of unbounded interval (which is a case if the auctioneer
is ignorant concerning the upper bound on the valuations) see [5].
3After all, all these prices will be lower than the price he agreed to when he became the winner.
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The price is uniquely determined because in each round the length of the current interval goes down by
one half. Since the initial interval is of length 2R, after R rounds the resulting interval is of length 1.
And since it is a half-open interval, it contains exactly one integer. This integer is declared to be the
price the winner of the auction has to pay for the object.
Example: Suppose there are four bidders, A, B, C, and D, with the following integer private valuations
from the interval [0, 16): vA = 11, vB = 4, vC = 15, vD = 9. To determine the winner and the price in
this setting the bisection auction takes four rounds and starts with an ask price equal to p = 8. Suppose
that each bidder chooses to respond truthfully and follows a straightforward strategy under which he
submits yes if an ask price is less or equal to his valuation and no otherwise. Bidders are not informed
about other bidders’ choices. The bisection auction proceeds as follows:
Round Price Lower Upper Bidder A Bidder B Bidder C Bidder D
bound bound vA = 11 vB = 4 vC = 15 vD = 9
1 8 0 16 yes no yes yes
2 12 8 16 no (no) yes no
3 10 8 12 yes (no) (yes) no
4 11 10 12 yes (no) (yes) (no)
Since three bidders submitted yes in the first round, the price increases to the middle of the current
price and the current upper bound. So the ask price of the second round is 12. These three bidders
remain active while bidder B drops out. Since there is only one yes submitted in the second round we
have a winner and we enter what we call the price determination phase. From now on, any bid of the
winner, bidder C, is considered as a yes-bid. Players A and D are still active. In the third round, there
are two yes-submissions (bidders A and C) so the price increases.4 Player D drops out. In the fourth
round, the auction terminates. Taking into account bids made during the last round we compute the
final lower and upper bounds. Since there were 2 yes-bids the upper bound remains to be 12 while the
lower bound becomes 11. The winner, bidder C, takes the object and pays price 11 which is the smallest
Walrasian price for the demand announced by the bidders that participated in this auction.
3 Experimental design and procedure
To compare the auction mechanisms we designed an experiment with three different treatments VA, EA
and BA which correspond to the Vickrey, English and bisection auction, respectively. The experiment
4Note that players A and D do not know that the winner is already determined. Moreover they are not able to derive
this information from price movements. Given this lack of information they have still the incentive to bid truthfully.
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was computerized with the help of zTree [3]. Throughout the experiment we used ECU (Experimental
Currency Unit) as a fictitious currency for expressing prices values, bids and earnings. One session
lasted for 10 periods and was played by 9 subjects. In each period they were randomly partitioned into
three groups of three bidders. At the beginning of each period every bidder got to know privately her
value which was independently drawn from the uniform distribution over the interval [32, 96). For every
session of one treatment a new set of valuations and a new matching scheme were randomly generated.
However, in order to maximize comparability of treatments we used the same sets of valuations and the
same matching schemes across treatments. After learning their value subjects had to bid against the
other group members in order to win the auction. The auction mechanism depended on the treatment.
Vickrey auction (VA): Subjects were asked to submit one bid which had to be an integer number
from the interval [0, 128). The subject with the highest bid won the auction and received the object (i.e.
she got her private value). The price the winner had to pay was equal to the second-highest bid that
was made within the group.
English auction (EA): The English auction was implemented by using an ascending clock procedure.
The price started at zero and increased continuously at a rate of 1 ECU per 2 seconds with the maximum
possible price of 127. Subjects had drop out at the price they were not willing to bid anymore. Dropping
out was irrevocable so that a bidder could no longer bid on the object. The last bidder of the group won
the object at the price 1 ECU below the price where the next-to-last bidder dropped out.5
Bisection auction (BA): The initial interval for the bisection auction was [0, 128). The initial ask
price was set to 64. The winner and the price were then determined by the procedure described in section
2.
In all treatments ties could happen if at least two persons show exactly the same behavior and end up to
be the “highest” bidders. In such cases the winner was randomly determined among the tied bidders. At
the end of each period the winner of the auction received his private value but had to pay the determined
final auction price. Each of the bidders was informed whether or not she bought the object, the selling
price of the object, as well as her gains and losses.
The experiment was conducted in the experimental behavior laboratory of the economic faculty at Maas-
5We explicitly have chosen this instead of the classical version of the ascending clock English procedure where the
winner gets the object at the price when the next-to-last bidder dropped out. This choice allowed us to simplify the part
of the subjects instructions where we explained the moment of dropping out, namely “ ... at the price you are not willing
to bid any more”. This change in rules has the consequences that in the implemented version dropping out as soon as the
price exceeded the private value is the dominant truth-telling strategy. Apart from that, these two versions are identical
and either of them can be used for comparison with the bisection and Vickrey procedures.
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tricht University. In total 135 subjects took place in the experiment. Most of them were undergraduate
students from economics or business. They could register for the experiment via Internet via their stu-
dent id. By this we prevented double registration. In total we conducted 5 sessions for each treatment,
with 9 subjects each. When subjects arrived at the laboratory they were randomly placed at isolated
computer terminals, so that they neither could see screens of the others nor get into eye contact with
them. The sessions lasted for about 60 minutes.
Before the start of a session subjects received written instructions (see Appendix 1). They were allowed
to privately ask questions which were also privately answered by the experimenters. As a part of the
instructions subjects were provided with examples of players’ valuations and were asked to calculate
the profit of each player for some assumed outcomes. The calculations were privately checked. The
experiment started only when every calculation was done correctly. After a session we asked participants
to fill in a post-experimental questionnaire (see the Appendix 2) where they could explain how they made
their decisions and give any comments on the experiment.
Each participant received an initial endowment of 3 EURO. At the end of the experiment the amount
which was earned was converted from ECU into Euro at the rate of 1 EURO = 4.5 ECU. For the case
that the earned amount was negative, the losses were deducted from the initial endowment. Average
earnings of the participants were about 13 Euro.
4 Experimental results
By and large we were able to replicate the common results on the Vickrey and the English auction.6
The data further shows that the bisection auction does not perform worse than the Vickrey auction. In
some aspects it was doing better and matches the performance of the English auction. In the following
we will analyze the data in more detail with respect to truth-bidding, learning, auctioneer’s revenue and
efficiency. If not mentioned explicitly we will base our statistical tests on the session level (i.e. on sta-
tistically independent observations). Therefore we aggregate the data by averaging over all observations
within a session.
6See also our discussion in the introduction.
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4.1 Bidding behavior
Theory predicts bidders in all auctions types to follow a truth-telling strategy. In the following we check
whether this is indeed the case or whether subjects tend to under- or overbid. When classifying subjects
as truth-tellers we accept small deviations from the private value and call it a value bid. A reasons for
small deviations could be that subjects ignored the possibility of ties. In such cases small deviations
(i.e. by 1 ECU) from true-value bidding do not change the subjective expected payoff. Another reason
for dropping out a bit too early or too late in the English auction could be the fear of missing the exact
time to drop out or indeed missing it. In the following paragraphs we define value bids in detail and
report results for the different treatments.
Vickrey auction: For VA truth-telling means to bid exactly the private value vi, hence we consider
any bid in the set {vi − 1, vi, vi +1} as a value bid. If the bid was above or below this set we consider it
as over- or underbidding, respectively.
The data shows that 48% of all 450 Vickrey bids are value bids while 30% of the bids were too high
and 22% of the bids were too low. Five subjects out of 45 followed the value bidding strategy in all 10
auction periods. The average number of periods where a subject bid his value was 3.6 periods.
English auction: In the implemented version of the English auction the truth-telling strategy is to
drop out as soon as the price p exceeds the private valuation vi, i.e. if p = vi + 1. Thus we consider it a
value bid if the drop-out price was in the set {vi, vi+1, vi+2}. If a player dropped out at a price below
or above this set, we considered it as under- and overbidding, respectively. Normally one particular
player, the winner of the auction, does not drop out and therefore does not completely reveal his bidding
strategy. These cases we regarded as value bids as long as the elicited behavior was consistent with value
bidding.7
Among 450 bids in the EA treatment 75% were value bids, 16% subjects were underbids and 9% overbids.
If we neglect the observations from the auction winners (because their willingness to bid was not fully
revealed), we observe a higher frequency of non-value bids (i.e. 63% value bids, 24% underbids and
13% overbids). Nine subjects (or 20% of all subjects) are consistent with value bidding in all 10 auction
periods. The average number of periods where a subject bid his value was 7.4 periods.
Bisection auction: The bisection auction was implemented along the description in Section 2. Each
period consisted of 7 rounds. In each round active bidders have to submit either yes or no for a current
7This classification can be viewed as too optimistic, i.e. we assume that buyers with a private value above the auction
price would never overbid. However, we will also report data without taking these buyers into account.
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Table 1: Value bids across different treatments.
VA EA BA
all observations 450 450 450
value bids 48% 75% 72%
underbids 22% 16% 14%
overbids 30% 9% 14%
fully informative observations 450 305 164
value bids 48% 63% 68%
underbids 22% 24% 17%
overbids 30% 13% 15%
number of value bidders 5 9 7
average number of truth-telling periods per subject 3.6 7.4 6.7
asked price. The truth-telling strategy is to regard the private valuation as threshold value and to state
yes if the asked price is less or equal to the threshold, and no otherwise. It is an inherent feature
of the bisection auction that bidders thresholds are only partially revealed. Hence, we cannot analyze
behavior precisely but we have to rely on bidder’s observable actions. Thus, we consider a strategy as
value-bidding if in all observed rounds the bidder’s submissions are consistent with a threshold from the
set {vi−1, vi, vi+1}. If the latent threshold proved to be lower or higher than this set, then the bidding
strategy was considered to be an under- or overbid, respectively.8,9
The analysis of the data gives us the following results: in 72% of all 450 cases subjects were consistent
with value bidding, in 14% they were underbidding and in 14% they overbid. If we restrict the analysis
to those bidders who were active all 7 rounds of a period (i.e subjects whose strategy we could observe
to the very end) the frequencies were almost the same: 68% value-bidding, 17% underbidding and 15%
of overbidding. Seven subjects out of 45 (or 15%) followed the value bidding strategy in all 10 auction
periods. The average number of periods where a subject was consistent with value-bidding was 6.7
periods.
Table 1 gives an overview over the value bids across treatments. It seems evident that EA and BA
outperform VA with respect to value bidding. In order to test this we calculated the average frequency of
value bidding per session and treatment, using all observations as well as using only the fully informative
observations (i.e bids where we could observe the strategy to the very end). A nonparametric Mann-
Whitney-U test on the session level yields a significant difference between BA and VA as well as between
8As for the English auction this classification can be seen as too optimistic. Hence we also report data from those
bidders who stayed active till the end of the auction (at least one bidder per auction).
9Notice that in a period a player can’t overbid in one round and underbid in another. Indeed if in a round a player
overbids and stays active, then in the next rounds the ask prices are certainly above his valuation so that underbidding is
not possible anymore. Similar, if in a round a player underbids and stays active, then in the next rounds the ask prices
are certainly below his valuation so that overbidding is not possible anymore.
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Figure 1: Bidding behavior: frequency of the different types of bids.
EA and VA. In both cases the null hypothesis that the frequency of value bidding is equal was rejected
in favor of statement that frequency is smaller in VA treatment (Mann-Whitney-U test, N = 10 for each
comparison, one-sided; based on all observations: p = 0.004 for both comparisons; based on the fully
informative observations: p = 0.079 for comparison VA with BA and p = 0.0159 for comparison VA with
EA). Between treatments BA and EA we did not find any significant difference. We summarize this in
Result 1 In terms of value bidding the bisection auction is comparable to the English auction and
significantly better than the Vickrey auction.
4.2 Learning process
In section 4.1 we analyzed the different auction formats from a static viewpoint. However for the question
of practical usability of the bisection auction it is also important to take a dynamic viewpoint. Do subjects
learn to place value bids? To answer this we analyze whether subjects get closer to value-bidding as they
gained more experience. For a first glance, Figure 1 shows how the frequencies of value-bidding, under-
and over-bidding develop over time.
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For each of the treatments, there is a tendency that value-bidding increases over time and underbidding
decreases over time. For VA these tendencies are most pronounced. With respect to overbids only VA
shows a clear tendency, with the other treatments it seems not to be clear. Interestingly, the number
of overbids in VA tends to increase rather than to decrease. In order to test the results statistically we
compare the number of deviations from value-bidding in the beginning of a session (periods 1-3) with
the number of deviations at the end of a session (periods 8-10) for each subject. We assume one subject
to be an independent observation and test the following null hypothesis: the number of deviations from
value-bidding in periods 1-3 is the same as in periods 8-10. For each the treatments we can reject the
null hypothesis in favor of the alternative hypothesis that the number of deviations in the beginning of
a session is higher than at the end of a session (Wilcoxon signed-rank test, N = 45 for each treatment,
p ≤ 0.02, one-sided).
The assumption of one subject being an independent observation is disputable. It rests on the fact that
subjects were randomly matched to other subjects in each round. They neither learned to whom they
were matched nor did they learn something about the other bidders values or bidding strategies. The only
thing they got to know was the final price and whether they bought the object or not.10 Nevertheless,
subjects interacted with each other repeatedly and their behavior is not strictly independent. Hence,
we run the same test on the level of independent observations (session-level) and we get similar results,
although only weakly significant (Wilcoxon signed-rank test, N = 5 for each treatment, p = 0.0625,
one-sided).
The tests above only make use of the cases were indeed some differences were found in the behavior at
the beginning and at the end (see e.g. [11]). This applies to 23, 29, and 26 subjects for the treatments
VA, EA, and BA, respectively. Among those subjects who did not contribute to the test results we can
distinguish between subjects who did not deviate from value bidding in any of the periods 1-3 and 8-10
and those subjects who did deviate to the same extend in the beginning and the end.
The first group of subjects always behaved rationally and therefore could not improve behavior. The
numbers of subjects were 5, 12, and 15, for VA, EA, and BA, respectively. Apparently there is more
rational behavior in EA and BA than in VA. In order to confirm this statistically we calculated the
average number of rational subjects (who placed value bids from the beginning) for each session. We
can reject the hypothesis of equal number of rational bidders in favor of the hypothesis that there are
10Some information could be extracted from the prices. For example since the VA price is the second highest bid, one
could infer that at least one bidder must have bid this price. However this information is rather vague and moreover it
does not give much information about the bidding strategy conditional on the valuation.
Bidding behavior in the bisection auction 11
Table 2: Learning across different treatments.
VA EA BA
learning not to deviate
subjects (WSR, one-sided) p = 0.02 p = 0.02 p = 0.02
sessions (WSR, one-sided) p = 0.0625 p = 0.0625 p = 0.0625
learning not to severely deviate
subjects (WSR, one-sided) p = 0.0013 n.s. p = 0.0013
sessions (WSR, one-sided) p = 0.0313 n.s. p = 0.0313
# rational bidders in periods 1-3 and 8-10 5 12 15
# non-learners in periods 1-3 and 8-10 17 5 4
# non-learners of severe deviations 7 4 1
more rational bidders in EA and BA than in VA (Mann-Whitney-U test, N = 10 for each comparison,
p ≤ 0.03, one-sided). A comparison between EA and BA does not result in significant differences.
The second group of subjects did not behave rationally and did also not learn to do so. The numbers
of subjects are 17, 5, and 4, for VA, EA, and BA, respectively. Apparently the number of non-learners
is much higher in VA than in the other auctions. In the same manner as above we can reject the
hypothesis that the number of non-learners is equal between VA and each of the other auctions in favor
of the hypothesis that the number of non-learners is higher in VA (Mann-Whitney-U test, N = 10 for
each comparison, p < 0.01, one-sided).
Table 2 gives an overview over the results. The whole analysis of this section was also done with respect
to severe deviations. We considered a deviation as severe if the bid / drop-out price / threshold value
had a difference of more than 5 to the dominant value.11 The learning results were slightly stronger
for severe deviations in VA and BA. For EA no significance was found due to the scarcity of severe
deviations.
In context of learning it is interesting to mention the observation made for the Vickrey auction. We
observed that in VA out of 67 cases where a bidder overbid and won12, only 15 (22%) led to a loss for
the bidder. Only in 3 out of the 15 cases a bidder revised his behavior after suffering a loss. Moreover,
there were 3 bidders who had losses more than once. This illustrates quite well that even from earlier
encountered losses bidders hardly learned that overbidding in the Vickrey auction is dominated. This
11The precise definition of severe deviation for BA treatment would be: If in at least one round of a period an ask price
is more than 5 above the bidder’s private valuation and he submits yes then the bidder is considered to severely overbid.
If in at least on round of a period an ask price is more than 5 below the bidder’s private valuation and he submits no then
the bidder is considered to severely underbid.
12Almost every second winner overbid his valuation.
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Table 3: Revenue across different treatments.
VA EA BA
average revenue in ECU 64.14 64.42 63.88
% of auction with pred. rev. level 42% 60% 52%
avg. abs. diff. between result and pred. in ECU 5.58 2.82 4.39
observation goes along with a result of Kagel [8] who found that the feedback mechanism to learn and
correct overbidding is weak in the Vickrey auction. To compare it with BA: out of 29 cases where the
winner overbid (which is half as much as in VA) the winner lost money in 13 cases (45%). After suffering
from losses only in 4 cases subjects continued overbidding.
Summarizing the findings we get
Result 2 In all treatments subjects learn to adjust their behavior in the direction of the dominant strat-
egy. However, in EA and BA there are significantly more subjects bidding rational right from the begin-
ning and significantly less subjects who do not adjust their behavior.
4.3 Revenue
According to the theoretical prediction the equilibrium price of an auction, and consequently revenue for
the auctioneer must be identical across treatments. Moreover the revenue should be equal to the second
highest valuation among the bidders of an auction. To compare the revenues we take a look at the
following measurements: first, we are interested in the average resulting revenue; second, the percentage
of auctions with the resulting revenue at the predicted level;13 and third, the average absolute difference
between the resulting and the predicted revenue. Table 3 presents the results aggregated over all sessions
and periods. We see that the English auction performs “best” in all three measures. With the exception
of average revenue the bisection auction comes second while the Vickrey auction comes last.
Testing the results of average revenue on a session level yields no significance. There is, however, a
difference in the percentage of auctions with the predicted revenue level between VA and EA as well as
between VA and BA. In both cases the null hypothesis of equal percentages is rejected in favor of the
alternative hypothesis that the percentage is smaller in VA (Mann-Whitney-U test, N = 10 for each
comparison, p < 0.05, one-sided). However, we are unable to reject, at conventional significance level,
13Similar as with the definition of a value bid, we accept a deviation by 1 ECU from the predicted revenue.
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the hypothesis of equality of the percentages for EA and BA. We did not find any significant difference
when comparing the percentages of auctions with a revenue higher than the predicted level. Neither
did we find any significant difference for the percentages of auctions with a revenue smaller than the
predicted level.
Further, the tests show that the average absolute difference between the resulting and the predicted
revenue is not the same for EA and BA as well as for EA and VA. In both cases the null hypothesis is
rejected in favor of the alternative hypothesis which states that this difference is smaller in EA (Mann-
Whitney-U test, N = 10 for each comparison, p < 0.05, one-sided). A comparison of VA and BA does
not result in significant differences.
Summarizing this section we achieve:
Result 3 Prices and therefore revenues are significantly more accurate in the English auction than in the
other two auction formats. Between the accuracy of the other formats, there is no significant difference.
The average revenues do not significantly differ from each other.
4.4 Efficiency
An efficient allocation requires assigning an object to the bidder with the highest valuation, because
independent of the price this maximizes total social welfare. We compare the auction formats with
respect to three different efficiency measures: allocative efficiency, absolute loss of efficiency and relative
loss of efficiency. The term allocative efficiency refers simply to the percentage of efficiently allocated
objects (i.e. the bidder with the highest valuation has to receive the object). Measuring efficiency in
this way does not however reflect the actual magnitude of efficiency lost due to misallocations. If the
“wrong” bidder obtains an object, his valuation may be substantially or only slightly below the highest
bidder’s valuation, causing either dramatic or small welfare losses. Our second and third measures take
this into account. With absolute loss of efficiency we refer to the difference between maximum possible
welfare and achieved welfare, i.e the difference between the bidders’ highest valuation and the valuation
of the bidder who wins the auction. The relative loss of efficiency measures the loss of efficiency relative
to the maximum possible welfare.
For each measure described above we calculated aggregate results over all sessions and periods (see Table
4). Again treatment EA shows the best figures. It is followed by VA and then by BA. However, there is
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Table 4: Efficiency across different treatments.
VA EA BA
allocative efficiency 86% 92% 86%
absolute efficiency loss in ECU 1.22 0.63 1.59
relative efficiency loss 1.59% 0.83% 2.03%
only one result which is significant: the hypothesis that EA and BA yield the same relative efficiency loss
can be rejected in favor of the hypothesis that EA yields a lower relative efficiency loss (Mann-Whitney-U
test, N = 10, p = 0.047, one-sided). While it seems that VA outperforms BA, the results are in favor
of BA if we only take the last 3 periods into account: the figures for VA are 82.2%, 0.95, 1.31%; for BA
they are 88.9%, 0.77, 1.02%. None of the measures differs significantly, however.
To sum up:
Result 4 No strong conclusive result can be found with respect to efficiency.
4.5 Post-experimental questionnaire
Since theory does not predict any significant differences in behavior but differences can be found it makes
sense to simply ask subjects about their strategies and thoughts. This was done in a post-experimental
questionnaire.14 Two problems occur with such kind of data. First the answers were not paid and hence
subjects could write anything they want. Second, most questions asked for free text answers and hence
it is difficult to provide quantitative summaries. Nevertheless we make the attempt to report a selection
of the data. Both authors have investigated the questionnaires independently, classifying the answers
into different types. Then we merged our classifications and the corresponding data to the following
summary.15
Vickrey auction. Twenty two out of 45 subjects indicated that they have chosen (not always from the
beginning of the session) the private valuation as a bid. Seven subjects wrote that they have explicitly
decided to make bids below their private valuation. Sixteen subjects indicated overbidding as a strategy
they have chosen to follow. Half of those 16 bid above their private value only if this value was very
high. From the answers of the overbidders we could see that many of them (namely 13) disconnected
14The questionnaire can be found in the Appendix 2.
15The raw data is available from the authors on request.
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the probability of getting the object from the price paid. By bidding higher than the private value they
thought to increase the probability without influencing the price they had to pay in case they win. They
failed to see that it were only the bad cases they won additionally.
English auction. The majority of the subjects, namely 34 out of 45, indicated that they dropped out
of the auction as soon as the price reached (or just past) their valuation. Underbidding and overbidding
were mentioned as a chosen strategy by 3 and 7 subjects, respectively. The underbidders attempted to
collude. When having a low private value they explicitly dropped out quickly after the period began
in order to decrease the price and therefore to increase the profit of the winner. Contrary, 3 of the 7
overbidders exhibited competitive behavior. They stayed active longer in order to increase the price and
thus to decrease the profit of the winner, hoping not to become the winner themselves.
Bisection auction. The most frequently mentioned strategies in BA were: submit ”No” if the asked
price is greater than the private value (21 subjects); and submit ”Yes” if the current price is smaller than
the private value (25 out of 45 subjects).16 Eight subjects mentioned that they chose to underbid while 9
mentioned overbidding. Seven subjects mentioned that sometimes, regardless of the private value, they
submitted ”No” in order to make the price to go down, hoping to increase thereby their potential profit.
Four subjects indicated that regardless of their valuation they submitted ”Yes” in the first round in
order not to be dropped out from the auction immediately. Also with the two last types we see that 13
subjects disconnected the price from the probability to win. They either tried to increase the probability
without taking into account the price. Or they tried to lower the price without realizing (or at least
underestimating) the risk to be dropped out.
Over all treatments several subjects wrote that the more money they obtained the more risk they were
willing to take. Many also explicitly mentioned the avoidance of losses as a primary goal. This was
mentioned by 11, 8 and 5 subjects in VA, BA and EA, respectively.
One of our goals was explicitly to test the auction mechanisms among non-professional bidders. However
an explicit restriction of the recruitment to subjects without auction knowledge had probably attracted
even more experienced subjects, since they might have thought to make a lot of money easily. Conse-
quently we asked subjects about their pre-knowledge ex-post. The answers are summarized in Tables 5
and 6.17 By and large the pre-knowledge seems to be rather similar across treatments with the exception
of the experience of online auctions in EA. However, most important for our purpose is that subjects in
16Some mentioned both and hence the total number sums up to more than 45.
17The questions about theoretical knowledge and practical experience were only asked in sessions 3-5 of the treatments,
so the table contains data on percentage of responded subjects.
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Table 5: Questionnaire: subjects’ knowledge of auction theory.
auction theory VA EA BA
knowledge
thorough 10% 10% 7%
superficial 26% 27% 21%
no 64% 63% 72%
Table 6: Questionnaire: practical experience of the subjects.
online auctions VA EA BA other auctions VA EA BA
experience experience
frequently 0% 22% 0% frequently 0% 0% 0%
sometimes 30% 41% 18% sometimes 7% 8% 18%
never 70% 37% 82% never 93% 92% 82%
treatment BA did not have more pre-knowledge then in the other auction formats.
Finally we asked subjects what they consider to be the optimal strategy. Subjects were given a pre-
determined set of answers which differ only in their degree of deviation from the dominant strategy.
Depending on the treatment the answer implied a bid (VA), a drop-out price (EA), or threshold value
(BA). The potential answers we gave to the subjects and the data are shown in Table 7.18
It can be seen that EA subjects produced the most correct answers, closely followed by the VA subjects.
The BA subjects gave the correct answer only in 22% of the cases and therefore differ significantly from
the other two treatments (Fisher exact test, N = 90 for both comparisons, p < 0.001, two-sided).19
It is interesting to compare the answers of the questionnaire with the decisions actually made in the
auctions. We say that a subject behaved consistently in a period if her decision in this period was in the
same category as the answer. Taking a look at the last three periods we found that in VA 22 subjects
(49%) were consistent in their decisions with what they considered to be optimal. Regarding the last two
periods both decisions were in the same category as the answer for 24 subjects (53%). Investigating the
very last period we see 30 subjects (67%) to be consistent. The results in EA turned out to be almost
the same, namely 21 (47%), 22 (49%) and 30 (67%), respectively.
It is quite difficult to check consistency of subjects in BA, because it is rarely possible to find a unique
18The question for the English auction was framed in such a way that also “exactly equal to the private value” was the
right answer.
19We neglect any dependence of persons here.
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Table 7: Questionnaire: choice of the optimal strategy.
VA EA BA
a number that is
5 or more below the private value 2 0 18
less than 5 below the private value 4 6 9
exactly equal to the private value 25 27 10
less than 5 above the private value 8 10 4
5 or more above the private value 6 2 4
threshold that corresponds to the used strategy. Only for a player who is active during all 7 rounds of an
auction the threshold can be find precisely, but if a player drops out or becomes the winner earlier then
we can only define a set of thresholds that correspond to actions he made. Since thresholds from this
set can be in different categories relatively to the player’s valuation we cannot say for sure whether he is
consistent or not.20 However, it is interesting to notice that among 25 subjects who behaved optimally
in more than 6 periods only 9 have answered the question correctly. Fifteen subjects decided that the
optimal threshold is below the valuation and 1 subject above the valuation. Among these 16 subjects
13 indicated that making decisions they often or even always thought in terms of threshold strategy.
Taking together the answers in the post-experimental questionnaire we find the following
Result 5 Despite the fact that the questionnaire was not paid according to performance we have no
reason to doubt that subjects answered truthfully. The answers give us the following insights:
1. Pre-knowledge of subjects was quite comparable except in the experience with online auctions.
There, however, VA and BA subjects had less experience than EA subjects and therefore our positive
findings with respect to VA and BA are conservative.
2. In EA, deviations from the truth-telling strategy were mainly driven by social preferences. Cognitive
issues seem to be a minor problem. In VA and BA several persons get trapped by the thoughts that it
is possible to regard the probability to win and the expected price as independent items to optimize.
They thought they could change one item with holding the other constant. This view can cause
overbidding as well as underbidding.
3. In BA it seems to be least clear what the optimal strategy is.
20For instance, in the example from Section 2 actions of player B could correspond to a threshold strategy with any
threshold from set [0, 7]. Notice that some thresholds from this set are less than valuation of player B and some are greater.
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5 Summary and Conclusions
The bisection auction is strategically equivalent to the Vickrey and the English auction. However,
previous results from the comparison of the Vickrey and the English auction have shown that we should
be cautious when drawing conclusions for the behavioral equivalence. Given that the bisection auction
does offer some advantages over the others in terms of speed and information revelation, the question
rises whether it could be used in practical settings as well. An ultimate answer to this can of course only
be given after a real practical application. The experiment can be seen as a first step into this direction.
In the paper we compared the bisection mechanism to two other mechanisms, the Vickrey auction and
the English auction. By and large the bisection auction performs somewhere in-between the others. It
is significantly better than the Vickrey auction (i.e. closer to theoretical predictions) with respect to the
frequency of value-bidding and the accuracy of the price. Compared to the English auction it performs
worse with respect to severe deviations from value bidding, the relative loss in efficiency and the absolute
difference between resulting and predicted revenue (see Tables 8 and 9 for the summary of the results).
A major reason for subjects to deviate from value bidding seems to be the thought that probability to
win can be seen independently from the expected price. Subjects who overbid in the Vickrey auction,
for example, increase the probability to win but they fail to see that the additional cases are those that
give a negative payoff. Some of the subjects see this negative dependence but they underestimate the
consequences.21 Similar thoughts are possible for the bisection auction: As laid out in Section 4.5, some
subjects submitted always “Yes” or “No” in the first round in order to increase the probability to win
or to decrease the expected price, respectively.
Given that the bisection auction faces the same cognitive trap as the Vickrey auction it is interesting to
see that fewer people run into it. We speculate that the reason therefore is that the bisection auction is
much more complex than the Vickrey auction. This has been evidenced by the huge number of wrong
answers in the questionnaire. People bidding their value know that they will not lose. The more complex
design of BA makes them more careful with respect to deviations. This is different in VA where some
very simple rules give subjects the impression to overview the situation.
There is one issue about the practical application that is still open and subject to further research.
In the Vickrey and the English auction the price and the winner are determined at the same time.
In the bisection auction normally the winner is determined first, then the auction goes on with the
21For a rational person no estimate is necessary. Overbidding is dominated. People who are, however, not able to
analytically understand the Vickrey auction might well just estimate an influence on the expected price.
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Table 8: Comparison of treatments.
BA vs. VA BA vs. EA EA vs. VA
Bidding behavoir
frequency of value-bidding
all observations BAÂ0.01VA BA≈EA EAÂ0.01VA
fully informative observations BAÂ0.01VA BA≈EA EAÂ0.02VA
number of rational bidders
in periods 1-3 and 8-10
all deviations BAÂ0.05VA BA≈EA EAÂ0.05VA
severe deviations BAÂ0.05VA EAÂ0.05BA EAÂ0.01VA
number of non-learners
in periods 1-3 and 8-10
all deviations BAÂ0.01VA BA≈EA EAÂ0.01VA
severe deviations BA≈VA EA≈BA EA≈VA
Efficiency
% of auctions with
efficient allocation BA≈VA BA≈EA EA≈VA
absolute loss of efficiency BA≈VA BA≈EA EA≈VA
relative loss of efficiency BA≈VA EAÂ0.05BA EA≈VA
Revenue
revenue BA≈VA BA≈EA EA≈VA
% of auctions with revenue
at the predicted level BAÂ0.05VA BA≈EA EAÂ0.05VA
absolute difference between
resulting and predicted revenue BA≈VA EAÂ0.05BA EAÂ0.05VA
Note: BAÂ0.05VA means that the bisection auction outperforms the Vickrey auction (in terms of a
particular measurement) at the level of significance 0.05. EA≈BA means that there is no significant
(any level less than 0.1) difference between the performance (in terms of a particular measurement) of
the English and the bisection auctions.
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Table 9: Comparison of measurements of a particular treatment over time.
BA EA VA
Bidding behavior
value bidding BAe Â0.07 BAb EAe Â0.07 EAb VAe Â0.07 VAb
Learning process
all deviations BAe Â0.05 BAb EAe Â0.05 EAb VAe Â0.05 VAb
severe deviations BAe Â0.01 BAb EAb ≈ EAe VAe Â0.01 VAb
Note: BAe Â0.05 BAb means that the performance of the bisection auction (in terms of a particular
measurement) is improved (at the level of significance 0.05) at the end in comparison with the beginning.
EAb ≈ EAe means that there is no significant (any level less than 0.1) difference between the performance
of the English auction (in terms of a particular measurement) in the beginning and at the end. N.e.d.
means that there is not enough informative data to make any conclusion.
determination of the price. Moreover the winner can conclude from the price movements that she has
been determined the winner (i.e. she submitted “yes” and nevertheless the asked price drops). In theory
as well as in the laboratory there is no communication between the winner and the other bidders. Hence
the problem does not exist there, since no bidder except the winner does know that the object is already
gone. However, in practical settings the winner might communicate his win and other bidders might
drop out of the auction. This could lead to an interesting instance of cartel behavior. On the other
hand the remaining bidders might engage in the spiteful action to drive up the price in order to harm
the winner. This behavior would have the effect that the bisection auction remains efficient and gives
a higher revenue to the auctioneer. Since we have seen some instances of competitive behavior in the
EA treatment we may also expect it in real life settings. Eventually this issue is highly speculative
and depends on the precise frame the auction takes place in. If the group of bidders knows each other,
then the cartel appears to us as the natural consequence. However in competitive market settings where
players get for example a long term advantage from driving out competitors from the market, they might
try to harm others as severe as possible.
All in all it seems to us that it is worthwhile trying to implement the bisection auction in a real life
setting.
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Appendix 1: Subjects instructions
Dear participant, thank you for taking part in this experiment! It will last about 1 hour. You will be
compensated according to your performance. In order to ensure that the experiment takes place in an
optimal setting, we would like to ask you to follow the general rules during the whole experiment:
• Do not communicate with your fellow students!
• Please switch off your mobile phone!
• Please read the instructions carefully. It is important that you understand the rules of the ex-
periment. If something is not explained well, please raise your hand. We will then answer your
questions privately. The instructions are identical for all participants.
• You may make notes on this instruction sheet if you wish.
• After the experiment please remain seated till you are paid off.
• If you do not obey the rules, the data becomes useless for us. Therefore we will have to exclude
you from this experiment and you will not receive any compensation.
Your decisions are anonymous. Neither your fellow students nor anybody else will ever learn them from
us.
The experiment consists of 10 periods. In each period the participants are randomly matched into
groups of three bidders. In each group a fictitious commodity is auctioned off. Before the auction starts
you will receive information about your private value for the commodity, expressed in Experimental
Currency Unit (ECU). The private values are independently and randomly determined. Thus, they may
be different for different bidders. Each integer value between 32 and 95 is equally likely. If you win
the auction you don’t receive the commodity but you receive an amount of money equal to your private
value. In return you have to pay the price resulting from the auction.
Who wins the auction and what price the winner has to pay is determined in the following way:
This part of the instructions is different for each treatment. See below the corresponding parts.
ECUs are transformed into Euros according to the following conversion rate: 1 Euro = 4.5 ECU .
You will obtain an initial endowment of 3 Euro. If you make losses in an auction these will be
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deducted from your previous gains (or from your initial endowment). You will receive your
final profit in cash at the end of the experiment.
Before the experiment starts please answer the following questions:
1. Assume three bidders Ann, Bert and Chris take part in the experiment. Ann gets informed about
her private value which is 62. What does Ann know about the private values of Bert and Chris?
(a) Bert and Chris have exactly the same private values, i.e. 62.
(b) Bert and Chris have different private values, i.e. their values are between 32 and 95 but not
62.
(c) Bert and Chris may have the same but may also have different values, i.e their values are
between 32 and 95 including 62.
2. Assume that the participants have the following private values: Ann 57, Bert 41 and Chris 75.
Assume further that Ann wins the auction and that the price is 48.
What are the profits of the three participants?
Ann:
Bert:
Chris:
3. Assume that the participants have the following private values: Ann 39, Bert 77 and Chris 77.
Assume further that Bert wins the auction and that the price is 83.
What are the profits of the three participants?
Ann:
Bert:
Chris:
After the experiment, we would like to ask you to complete a short questionnaire.
Thank you again and good luck with the experiment!
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Part of the instructions corresponding to the Vickrey auction.
After you observe your private value, you have to place a bid which is allowed to be between 0 and 127
ECU. After every bidder in your group has placed his bid the winner and the price at which he obtains
the commodity is determined. The bidder with the highest bid is the winner. The price he has to pay
is equal to the second highest bid. If more than 1 bidder submitted the same highest bid, the winner
is determined randomly among these bidders. The price he has to pay is, again, equal to the second
highest bid which in this case coincides with the highest bid.
The profit of the winner is determined as the difference between his private value and the price. If his
private value is greater than the price, he receives this difference. If his value is less than the price,
he has to pay this difference. The other bidders do not receive anything and do not pay anything.
Please make your decisions carefully - your reward will depend on your performance during the experi-
ment. Note that you can make losses, but it is always possible, however, to bid in such a way that you
avoid losses for sure.
You will get information and make your decisions via the computer terminal. In each period you go
through the following rounds:
• You observe your private value for the commodity. You will not be informed about the values of
the others, just as they do not know your private value.
• You submit your bid which is allowed to be between 0 and 127 ECU.
• You observe whether or not you bought the commodity, the price, your gains/losses in this auction
and in total including all previous auctions.
• A new period starts. You will be randomly matched to two other participants.
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Part of the instructions corresponding to the English auction.
The auction starts with a price of 0. Every 2 seconds the current price is increased by 1. As long as
you are not reacting we assume that you are active, that means you are bidding the current price. If
the price reaches a level which you are not willing to bid anymore you have to click the button ”DROP
OUT”. From this moment on you are not active anymore. For active bidders the price continues to
increase. The auction stops as soon as there is only one active bidder left. The last remaining bidder
becomes the winner. The price the winner has to pay is 1 ECU below the price where the second last
bidder dropped out. If several bidders drop out simultaneously and no bidder is left active, the winner is
determined randomly among these bidders and the price is 1 ECU below the price where they dropped
out. If upon reaching the maximal price of 128 ECU there is more than one active bidder, then the
commodity is randomly allocated among these active bidders for a price of 127 ECU.
The profit of the winner is determined as the difference between his private value and the price. If his
private value is greater than the price, he receives this difference. If his value is less than the price,
he has to pay this difference. The other bidders do not receive anything and do not pay anything.
Please make your decisions carefully - your reward will depend on your performance during the experi-
ment. Note that you can make losses, but it is always possible, however, to bid in such a way that you
avoid losses for sure.
You will get information and make your decisions via the computer terminal. In each period you go
through the following rounds:
• You observe your private value for the commodity. You will not be informed about the values of
the others, just as they do not know your private value.
• You observe successive change of the price and indicate your dropping out by clicking the button
”DROP OUT” at the price you are not willing to bid any more.
• After the period ends you observe whether or not you bought the commodity, the price, your
gains/losses in this period and in total including all previous periods.
• A new period starts. You will be randomly matched to two other participants.
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Part of the instructions corresponding to the bisection auction.
One period consists of 7 rounds. For each round the interval where the bidders are competing for the
commodity is determined. The asked price in a round is set to the middle of this interval. In the first
round the interval is [0, 128) and the asked price is equal to 64. All bidders receive the status “Active”.
Active bidders are asked whether they are willing to bid the current asked price for the commodity. A
bidder replies “Y ES” to announce his willingness and “NO” to announce his unwillingness. After all
bidders submit their decision, the interval and the asked price of the next round as well as the status of
bidders are determined according to the following rule:
• In case 3 “yes”-bids are submitted: All three bidders are willing to bid the asked price for
one available commodity. It means that at the asked price demand exceeds supply and therefore
we can concentrate our search to the upper half of the previous interval. The price goes up to the
middle of this new interval. It means that in round 2 the interval will be [64, 128) and the price
96. All active bidders remain active.
• In case 2 “yes”-bids and 1 “no”-bid are submitted: Two bidders are willing to bid the
asked price for one available commodity. It means that at the asked price demand exceeds supply
and therefore, again, we can concentrate our search to the upper half of the previous interval.
The price goes up to the middle of this new interval. It means that in round 2 the interval will
be [64, 128) and the price 96. The bidders that are active in the next round are the ones that
submitted “yes”-bids. The bidder with a “no”-bid drops out of the auction. His status remains
“Dropped out” till the end of the period. He is not free anymore to choose between “yes” and
“no”. Since the prices in all next rounds will be greater than the price that this bidder declined
when he became a drop out, his decisions in all forthcoming rounds are considered to be “no”.
• In case 1 “yes”-bid and 2 “no”-bids are submitted: There is only one bidder who is willing
to bid the asked price. The bidder with a “yes”-bid becomes the winner of the auction. His status
remains “The winner” till the end of the period. The bidders that are active in the next round
are the ones that submitted “no”-bids. By their future bids the price the winner has to pay is
determined. The new interval is set equal to the lower half of the previous interval. So the price
goes down to the middle of this new interval. It means that in round 2 the interval will be [0, 64)
and the price 32. The winner is not free to choose between “yes” and “no”. Since the prices in all
next rounds will be lower than the price that this bidder agreed on when he became the winner,
his decisions in all forthcoming rounds are considered to be “yes”.
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• In case 3 “no”-bids are submitted: No bidder is willing to bid the asked price for the com-
modity. It means that at the asked price supply exceeds demand and therefore we can concentrate
our search to the lower half of the previous interval. So the price, again, goes down to the middle
of this new interval. It means that in round 2 the interval will be [0, 64) and the price 32. All
active bidders remain active.
The way to decide about the status of bidders, the change of interval and the price is the same in all
rounds. Depending on submitted bids we subsequently restrict attention to either the lower half or to
the upper half of the previous interval. The only information bidders get after each round is the new
interval, the new price and own status. The bidders are not informed about the status of others, so
during the period you don’t get to know whether there are drop outs or the winner among the other
bidders. Thus, an active bidder does not know whether he is competing for the commodity or he is
determining the winner’s price. After round 7 the new interval is determined. The price the winner has
to pay is equal to the lower bound of this interval. If the winner was not found during 7 rounds (i.e. if
in no round exactly one bidder submitted a “yes”-bid), the status of the bidders after the last round is
determined and the commodity is randomly allocated to one of the remaining active bidders.
The profit of the winner is determined as the difference between his private value and the price. If his
private value is greater than the price, he receives this difference. If his value is less than the price,
he has to pay this difference. The other bidders do not receive anything and do not pay anything.
Please make your decisions carefully - your reward will depend on your performance during the experi-
ment. Note that you can make losses, but it is always possible, however, to bid in such a way that you
avoid losses for sure.
You will get information and make your decisions via the computer terminal. In each period you go
through the following phases of the auction:
• You observe your private value for the commodity. You will not be informed about the values of
the others, just as they do not know your private value.
• ROUND 1: You are “Active”. You observe the initial interval [0, 128) and the initial price 64. You
have to indicate your decision “YES, I’m willing to bid this price for the commodity” or “NO, I’m
not willing to bid this price for the commodity” by clicking the corresponding button.
• ROUNDS 2-7: You observe your current status that can be “Active”, “Dropped out” or “The
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winner”. You observe the current interval and the current price. If you are active you have to
indicate your decision”YES” or ”NO” for the current price. If you are a drop out or the winner
you are not allowed to submit bids anymore.
• After round 7 the period ends and you observe whether or not you bought the commodity, the
winning price, your gains/losses in this period and in total including all previous periods.
• A new period starts. You will be randomly matched to two other participants.
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Appendix 2: Post-experimental questionnaire
Subject ID (see the card you have drawn in the beginning):
Year of birth:
Gender:
Nationality:
Study:
In the following we are interested to learn how you reached your decision. Please answer the following
questions as precisely as possible.
What factors did influence your decision? What information did you use?
Given the information and factors mentioned above, how did you make up your strategy?
Did you encounter problems in particular with the software? If yes, what problems?
Did you ever deal with auctions in one of your courses?
© yes, thoroughly
© yes, but superficially
© never
Do or did you participate in online auctions (e.g. www.ebay.com)?
© frequently
© sometimes
© never
Do or did you participate in other but online auctions?
© frequently
© sometimes
© never
This last part of the questionnaire is different for each treatment. See below the corresponding parts.
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Part of the questionnaire corresponding to BA treatment.
Consider the following strategy: Given your private value of the commodity you chose a number. When-
ever the asked price is equal to or below this number you submit ”Yes”. If the asked price is above this
number you submit ”No”.
Did you use such a threshold strategy?
© always
© often
© sometimes
© never
Suppose you cannot participate in the auction yourself but you can submit a number to a software agent
who bids for you according to the strategy described in the question above.
Given that you know your private value, which number would maximize your payoff?
© a number that is 5 or more below the private value
© a number that is less than 5 below the private value
© the number exactly equal to the private value
© a number that is less than 5 above the private value
© a number that is 5 or more above the private value
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Part of the questionnaire corresponding to VA treatment.
Which strategy do you consider to maximize your payoff?
© submit a bid that is 5 or more below the private value
© submit a bid that less than 5 below the private value
© submit a bid exactly equal to the private value
© submit a bid that is less than 5 above the private value
© submit a bid that is 5 or more above the private value
Part of the questionnaire corresponding to EA treatment.
Which strategy do you consider to maximize your payoff?
© drop out if the price exceeds a value which is 5 or more below the private value
© drop out if the price exceeds a value which is less than 5 below the private value
© drop out if the price exceeds the private value
© drop out if the price exceeds a value which is less than 5 above the private value
© drop out if the price exceeds a value which is 5 or more above the private value
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Appendix 3: Tables with data used for the conducted tests
session 1 session 2 session 3 session 4 session 5
BA 64.4% 81.1% 68.9% 75.5% 68.9%
BAb 48.1% 85.2% 74.1% 70.4% 59.2%
BAe 88.9% 88.9% 74.1% 81.5% 70.4%
VA 53.3% 26.6% 45.5% 60.0% 54.4%
VAb 33.3% 25.9% 25.9% 59.2% 51.8%
VAe 59.2% 25.9% 70.4% 66.7% 55.5%
EA 69.9% 76.7% 68.9% 76.7% 75.5%
EAb 62.9% 77.8% 62.9% 70.4% 59.2%
EAe 62.9% 81.5% 70.4% 88.9% 92.6%
Table 10: Frequency of value bidding.
session 1 session 2 session 3 session 4 session 5
BA 65.7% 66.6% 63.5% 71.9% 58.9%
VA 53.3% 26.6% 45.5% 60.0% 54.4%
EA 71.0% 65.6% 53.4% 67.7% 63.3%
Table 11: Frequency of value-bidding among the players with fully informative bids.
session 1 session 2 session 3 session 4 session 5
BA 21.1% 12.2% 15.6% 3.3% 20.0%
VA 17.8% 23.3% 41.1% 11.1% 17.8%
EA 7.8% 15.5% 18.9% 18.9% 23.3%
Table 12: Frequency of underbidding.
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session 1 session 2 session 3 session 4 session 5
BA 14.4% 6.7% 15.5% 21.1% 11.1%
VA 28.9% 50.0% 13.3% 28.9% 27.7%
EA 22.2% 7.8% 12.2% 4.4% 1.1%
Table 13: Frequency of overbidding.
session 1 session 2 session 3 session 4 session 5
all deviations
BA 1 5 4 3 2
VA 1 0 0 2 2
EA 2 3 3 1 3
severe deviations
BA 1 6 5 5 4
VA 3 0 0 2 3
EA 6 6 6 6 6
Table 14: Number of rational bidders in periods 1-3 and 8-10.
session 1 session 2 session 3 session 4 session 5
all deviations
BA 2 0 0 1 1
VA 4 5 3 3 2
EA 1 1 2 1 1
severe deviations
BA 1 1 1 1 0
VA 3 3 0 1 0
EA 0 0 0 0 1
Table 15: Number of non-learners in periods 1-3 and 8-10.
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session 1 session 2 session 3 session 4 session 5
BA 62.7 62.9 64.4 66.6 62.8
VA 60.6 67.5 62.7 66.3 63.6
EA 65.3 64.7 67.6 62.2 62.3
Table 16: Average revenue of auctions.
session 1 session 2 session 3 session 4 session 5
BA 53% 60% 47% 53% 47%
VA 43% 27% 40% 43% 57%
EA 43% 73% 63% 63% 57%
Table 17: Percentage of auctions with revenue at the predicted level.
session 1 session 2 session 3 session 4 session 5
BA 4.77 3.51 3.87 5.63 3.43
VA 7.97 6.33 6.23 4.83 2.53
EA 4.83 1.53 1.97 3.07 2.71
Table 18: Average difference between the resulting and the predicted revenue (in absolute value).
session 1 session 2 session 3 session 4 session 5
BA 87.0% 97.0% 80.0% 80.0% 87.0%
VA 90.0% 67.0% 83.0% 87.0% 100.0%
EA 80.0% 97.0% 97.0% 97.0% 90.0%
Table 19: Percentage of auctions with the efficient allocation.
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session 1 session 2 session 3 session 4 session 5
BA 3.00 0.17 1.73 1.60 1.43
VA 0.53 2.33 1.57 1.57 0.00
EA 1.23 0.20 0.43 0.20 1.07
Table 20: Average loss of efficiency (in absolute value).
session 1 session 2 session 3 session 4 session 5
BA 3.62% 0.33% 2.45% 2.08% 1.66%
VA 0.83% 3.28% 1.89% 1.94% 0.00%
EA 1.57% 0.22% 0.67% 0.34% 1.34%
Table 21: Average relative loss of efficiency.
